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Abstract
This paper argues that political institutions play an important role in shaping the evolution-
ary trajectory of preferences. We consider a population with two preference groups. A political
institution provides the platform and a set of rules for the two groups to battle over the relative
representativeness of their preference traits for the high positions in the social hierarchy. This
political process affects the economic outcomes of the two groups, subsequently the intergener-
ational transmission of preferences. We study how conducive different political institutions are
to spreading preference traits that induce better economic outcomes. We find that any pref-
erence trait can be prevalent under “exclusive” political institutions. Therefore, a society can
be trapped in a state in which preference traits associated with unfavorable economic outcomes
persist. On the other hand, preference evolution under “inclusive” political institutions has
stronger selection power and only the preference traits that result in the largest comparative
advantage in holding a high position can be prevalent.
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“It is always necessary to examine the possible bearing of deep-rooted social and economic
changes upon the nature of the values held by the members of a given stratum or society.”
—— Max Weber (1896)
1 Introduction
A large body of works in the literature of political economy is devoted to understanding the role of
political institutions in economic performance.1 Most of them are premised on the assumption that
preferences of the members in a society are exogenous and fixed. However, in the real world, the
distribution of preferences in a population can endogenously evolve across generations over time
and historical evidence demonstrates that political institutions have considerable influence on this
evolutionary process.2 On the other hand, evolutionary game theorists provide the fundamental
methodologies for studying the evolutionary foundation of preferences.3 Yet, they have not taken
political institutions into consideration.
Preferences, such as time discounting, risk aversion, social preferences, work ethics and the like
are crucial for technology advancement or the emergence of more efficient economic institutions.4
Therefore, to have a better understanding of the long run impacts of political institutions on
economic outcomes, it is necessary to examine how political institutions shape the evolution of
1See for example, North and Thomas (1973), Olson (1982), March and Olsen (1984), North (1990), Przeworski
and Limongi (1993), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994, 2003,
2008, 2009), Barro (1996, 1997), Be´nabou (1996), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2006), Tavares and Wacziarg (2001),
Glaeser et al. (2004), Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008),
Besley and Persson (2011), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), among many others.
2For example, the “Americanization” policy in the early 20th Century effectively induced cultural integration in
the United States (See Kuran and Sandholm (2008)). In some circumstances, immigrants’ values may be able to
spread through the whole society because they have better opportunities to access scarce resources through political
institutions. Chinese minorities in South-East Asia serve as good examples. As discussed by Landes (1998), “the
same value thwarted by “bad government” at home can find opportunity else where, as in the case of China.”
3This paper closely follows the works on indirect evolutionary approach including Gu¨th and Yaari (1992), Gu¨th
(1995), Bester and Gu¨th (1998), McNamara, Gasson and Houston (1999), Sethi and Somanathan (2001), Ok and
Vega-Redondo (2001), Van Veelen (2006), Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2007), Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel (2007a,
2007b), Kuran and Sandholm (2008), Akc¸ay et al. (2009), Alger (2010) and Alger and Weibull (2010, 2012, 2013).
See Robson (2001) and Robson and Samuelson (2011) for a survey on another important approach for studying
preference evolution.
4As argued by Weber (1930), the spread of the “spirit of capitalism”, including patience, prudence, frugality and
a work ethic for both entrepreneurs and laborers, is the key to the rise of modern enterprises. See also the discussion
by Doepke and Zilibotti (2008).
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preferences at the first place. This paper attempts to fill in the gaps between these two streams of
literature by comparatively investigate preference evolution under different political institutions.
We construct the following model. A population is divided into two groups: a majority pref-
erence group in which agents carry a certain preference trait and an alternative preference group
in which agents carry another preference trait. We emphasize that these preference groups do
not necessarily coincide with groups defined by members’ ancestries, ethnicity or cultural origins.5
Moreover, each preference group acts as a voting bloc and is represented in a political institu-
tion. As argued by Congleton (2011), interest groups can be organized by the members’ cultural
traits such as preferences, norms and ideologies, these groups can include members with various
occupations and incomes and may have considerable influence on political decision making.
A society generally has different social positions, constituting a social hierarchy. Some are
granted with power and privilege and are linked to leadership roles (e.g., those of a civil servant
or manager), while others are not.6 Assume that there are two types of positions in the social
hierarchy: high and low. Political institution provides a platform and set of rules for the polit-
ical representatives from the two groups to battle over the representativeness of their preference
traits for the high positions in the social hierarchy (to determine the allocation of high positions
between the two groups). In particular, the set of rules determine the de jure distribution of po-
litical powers between the two groups. Following the recent works on political economy including
Besley and Persson (2011) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), who emphasize the importance of
the distribution of political powers on the economic consequences of different societies, we index
different political institutions by their degrees of “inclusiveness.” We call a political institution
more “exclusive” if the alternative preference group is excluded from high positions or faces barri-
ers to acquire high positions. On the other hand, a political institution is more “inclusive” if the
5For example, as discussed in Landes (1998), in Thailand, the Thai government strongly discourages separate
Chinese schooling and Chinese have taken Thai names to better fit in. In Malaysia, affirmative actions urge Chinese
minorities to adopt Malay partners. Hence, the industrious values brought by the Chinese immigrants spread without
ethnic or cultural boundaries.
6Guilds in the Middle Ages serve as a good historical example of a source of high positions in the social hierarchy.
At the time, the guilds enjoyed certain privileges granted by the king or the state and had strong control over the
urban economy (Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)). Civil positions in Ancient China are another examples as they
were usually linked with land and wealth (the main channel for Chinese citizens to achieve these positions was the
imperial exam, which tested knowledge of Confucian morals). As stated in Bai and Jia (2015), the exam system
created a gentry class. In the society today, higher education and professional degrees are often associated with high
positions in the social hierarchy since most occupations corresponding to favorable economic outcomes require such
degrees.
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political representatives from the two groups interact more equally to determine allocation of high
positions.7
After the allocation of high positions between the two groups is determined, agents from the
two groups enter a random matching process that pairs each high position holder with a low
position holder to engage in pairwise economic activity. The matching and interaction paradigm
we develop follows Alger and Weibull (2012, 2013).8 Note that the interaction between positions
and preferences is crucial for the economic outcome generated by each pair of agents as well as
how they divide the economic outcome.9 We impose one weak and natural assumption on the
dividing rule between each pair of agents: the agent with high position has a larger share of the
economic outcome than the agent with low position. After the economic outcomes in one generation
are realized, a new generation of agents is born. Each agent has one child who is born without
preference. Parents are motivated to exert effort to inculcate their own preferences into their
children; when inculcation fails, a child inherits preference trait from a randomly drawn role model
as in Bisin and Verdier (2001).10
Given the cultural transmission process, we derive an explicit dynamic describing the evolution
of preferences. The main solution concept for analyzing the dynamic is called locally evolution-
arily stable preference (LESP). LESP examines whether a gradual change in the distribution of
preferences (the emergence of a small alternative preference group with a similar preference to the
one that dominates the society) can result in a new thriving preference trait or merely one that is
quickly assimilated. By analyzing LESP of the dynamic, we are able to determine which preferences
can be prevalent in the long run under a certain political institution.11
7Exclusive political institutions defined in this paper are different from extractive political institutions defined in
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), in which control rights are given to a small group of elites. In this paper, we do not
discuss extractive political institutions.
8However, our paradigm is essentially different from theirs because their paradigm is only suitable for ex-ante
symmetric interactions while ours are designed to handle ex-ante asymmetric interactions because of the existence of
different positions in the social hierarchy.
9For example, Akerlof (1982) pioneers the study of gift exchange and labor contracts and argues that labor
workers’ preferences for fairness should be taken into consideration to induce more efficient production. Recent work
in experimental economics such as Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007) demonstrates that inequality aversion can lead to
an informal contract between the employer and the employee enhancing productivity more than a formal contract.
Francois and Zabojnik (2005) analyze the role of trustworthiness in economic development. They argue that whether
new technologies can be adopted and spread depends on whether firm owners can trust contractors.
10Since we are considering preference groups instead of cultural/ethnic groups, there is no barrier for a child to
adopt a preference trait different from his parent’s.
11Note that if we strengthen the assumption on the dividing rule of economic outcome in each pair of agents, all
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By establishing this evolutionary model, we seek to answer how conducive different political
institutions are to spreading preferences that induce better economic performance.
We first investigate the most exclusive political institution, in which the majority has exclusive
right to determine the allocation of positions in the social hierarchy. This political institution is
referred to as unadulterated majoritarianism (see Reynolds (2000)). We show that any preference
trait can be LESP under this exclusive political institution because the majority members are able
to obtain all the high positions through its group’s political power and achieve higher economic
outcomes than the alternative preference group members. This result suggests that poor economic
performance may persist because such a political institution is able to trap a society into a state
populated with agents with preference traits associated with unfavorable economic outcomes.12
We then examine the most inclusive political institution in which political representatives from
the two groups enter a negotiation on the allocation of high positions and the bargaining powers
(political powers) of the two groups are proportional to their group sizes. We call this political
institution egalitarianism.13 This political institution represents the common form of proportional
representative democracy. The equilibrium allocation of high positions between the two groups is
determined by comparing groups’ marginal benefits of getting more high positions. This in turn
determines if the majority’s preference trait is able to assimilate the alternative preference trait
through preference evolution. We find that only the preference traits that locally result in the
largest comparative advantage in holding a high position (the largest marginal benefit of getting
more high positions) can be LESP.
We generalize our analysis to a range of political institutions between unadulterated majori-
tarianism and egalitarianism. These political institutions represents the historical incidents in
which the alternative preference group faces entry barriers to participating in politics such as vot-
ing restrictions. The results obtained unites the conclusions drawn previously on unadulterated
majoritarianism and egalitarianism: preference evolution has stronger selection power under more
our results will still hold if we employ a stronger solution concept, evolutionarily stable preference (ESP), in which
the small alternative preference group does not need to carry a preference trait similar to the majority (this can be
thought as a breakthrough in the primitives).
12Note that preference evolution under unadulterated majoritarianism hinges on the majority’s preference. So if
the majority’s preference trait is associated with favorable economic outcomes, the society would not be trapped in
a poor state.
13Under this political institution, the bargaining power of each group exactly reflects the number of voters from the
group. In other words, this political institution promotes equality of opportunities. We emphasize that egalitarianism
in our model refers to equality of opportunities rather than equality of outcomes.
5
inclusive political institutions because the advantage in bargaining power of the majority becomes
less important in determining the allocation of high positions.
We believe that our context is especially suitable for analyzing scenarios in which a homogeneous
population faces cultural importations, invasions or immigration. For example, in the 16th century,
the Catholic Europe faced challenges brought by the Protestant Reformation. The religious dissents
carried preference traits different from that of the incumbents and they tried to climb up the
social hierarchy predominated by the incumbents. In Western Europe, where political institutions
were more inclusive, Protestants disproportionately occupied more of the high positions and their
industrious values spread; the opposite occurred in the more exclusive Southern Europe.
We extend the model in three directions: 1) We allow the alternative group to segregate itself
from the majority and we investigate how different political institutions affect the decision of self-
segregation. Our result can explain why certain immigrant groups establish closely connected
business networks and enclave labor markets and they are able to preserve their own cultures over
generations.14 2) We consider different outside options for the two groups because outside options
serve as an important source of de facto political powers for the groups. We show that high outside
option for the majority can account for the persistence of economic backwardness under inclusive
political institutions. 3) We incorporate “imperfect empathy” into the cultural transmission process
as in Bisin and Verdier (2001) and find that the main results of the paper are robust.
Note that several recent theoretical works on cultural/preference evolution account for the
effects of political institutions.15 The critical difference between our paper and these works is that
the primary aspect of political institutions we consider is that of determining the allocation of
positions in the social hierarchy rather than fiscal policies, legal enforcement, school financing or
regulations. Moreover, we comparatively study a range of different political institutions and we
consider the evolution of a general set of preference traits instead of some specific preferences.
In addition, an important recent literature documents the long-term persistence and long last-
ing effects of different institutional arrangement on the transmission of cultural traits including
14For example, tracing back at the history of immigration to the United States, certain groups such as some Asian
groups, had strong economic performance and have been able to preserve their own cultural identities even when they
were under-represented in politics, while other groups have not. See Hirschman and Wong (1986) for a discussion on
Asian minorities.
15For example, Bisin and Verdier (2000b, 2005), Tabellini (2008a), Gradstein and Justman (2002, 2005), Fershtman
and Heifetz (2006), Dixit (2009), Aghion et al. (2010), Aghion et al. (2011), Alesina et al. (2012) and Alesina et al.
(2014).
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preferences.16 We hope that the model proposed in this paper can further contribute to this line
of research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 develops our notions
of evolutionarily stability. Section 4 applies these notions to study the evolution of preferences
under different political institutions. Section 5 considers three extensions of the model. Section 6
presents concluding remarks.
2 The Model
2.1 Population and preferences
Consider a continuum population. Each agent in the population carries a preference trait θ. The
set of potential preferences is denoted by a metrizable set Θ. This set can capture fundamental
preferences or “character” traits such as time discounting, risk aversion, social preferences, work
ethics, conscientiousness, perseverance, sociability, attention, self-regulation, self-esteem, the ability
to defer gratification, and the like.
The population is divided into groups by preferences: a majority preference group with prefer-
ence trait θ ∈ Θ and an alternative preference group with preference trait θ′ ∈ Θ. The distribution
of preferences in each generation is captured by a single parameter µ. The size of the majority
group is 1− µ and the size of the alternative preference group is µ, where 0 ≤ µ < 12 .
2.2 The Matching Process and Pairwise Interaction
There is a social hierarchy in the population, which consists of two types of positions: high and
low. Each agent will have either one of these two positions. The total number of high positions
and the total number of low positions available each equals half of the population.17
An agent’s position in the social hierarchy corresponds to his role in the subsequent economic
activities. For the purpose of illustration, we use “manager,” denoted by role h, to represent the
high position, and “worker,” denoted by role l, to represent the low position hereafter.
16See for example, Bainfield (1958), Putnam (1993), Alesina and Fuchs-Schuu¨ndeln (2007), Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales (2008), Tabellini (2008b), Grosjean (2011), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn
(2013), among many others. Also see Bisin and Verdier (2011) and Alesina and Giuliano (2014) for excellent surveys.
17Relaxing this assumption would be a possible extension of the model. For example, if the mass of high positions is
less than 1
2
, one can study a context in which some agents are unmatched, or the agents instead engage in interactions
with more than two players.
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The matching process is dictated by k(µ), which describes allocation of managers and workers
between the majority and the alternative preference group. In particular, k(µ) captures how high
positions are disproportionally allocated (to the majority group). Let 1−µ2 + k(µ) of the majority
and µ2 − k(µ) of the alternative preference group to be managers. When k(µ) > 0, the number
of managers among the majority is more than 50 percent of its group size; when k(µ) < 0, the
number of managers among the alternative preference group is more than 50 percent of its group
size. Assume k(µ) is continuous in µ. How k(µ) is determined under different political institutions
is one of the main results of this paper; we delay that discussion to Section 4. For now, we start
our discussion by assuming k(µ) to be exogenous.
The range for k(µ) is [−µ2 , µ2 ], ensuring neither the number of managers nor the number of
workers among the alternative preference group is negative. Note that k(µ) is constructed such
that exactly half of the population is managers and the other half is workers, ensuring that no
agent is unmatched. Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of k(µ).
Figure 1
Let Pr[θ1|θ2, µ, k(µ)] denote the probability that a θ2 worker matches with a θ1 manager, for
θ1, θ2 ∈ {θ, θ′}. We have
Pr[θ|θ, µ, k(µ)] = Pr[θ|θ′, µ, k(µ)] = 1− µ+ 2k(µ) (1)
Pr[θ′|θ, µ, k(µ)] = Pr[θ′|θ′, µ, k(µ)] = µ− 2k(µ). (2)
Each matched pair of agents engages in some identical pairwise interactions. For example, they
form a farming cooperative to harvest crops or a factory to produce goods. The preferences of the
two agents determine how much economic outcome is generated and how it is divided.18
18For example, consider a pairwise contractual game between an manager and a worker. The manager offers a
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For θ1, θ2 ∈ {θ, θ′}, let Vh(θ1, θ2) denote the equilibrium payoff of the manager (role h) whose
preference is θ1 and matched with a worker (role l) whose preference is θ2. Similarly, let Vl(θ1, θ2)
denote the equilibrium payoff of the worker whose preference is θ2 and matched with a manager
whose preference is θ1. Define T (θ1, θ2) = Vh(θ1, θ2) + Vl(θ1, θ2) as the total surplus of a firm with
a θ1 manager and a θ2 worker.
19 Assume that Vh and Vl are continuous in both arguments. The
following assumption on the equilibrium payoffs provides a simple but natural division rule between
the two agents in each pair: the manager earns a higher payoff than the worker.
Assumption [A1] Vh(θ1, θ2) > Vl(θ1, θ2), for any θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ.
Given the matching process and pairwise interactions, one can calculate the average payoffs
of each group. Let F (µ, k(µ)) denote the average payoff of the majority.
F (µ, k(µ)) =
1
1− µ ·
[(1− µ
2
− k(µ)
)
Pr [θ|θ, µ, k(µ)]T (θ, θ) +
(µ
2
+ k(µ)
)
Pr[θ|θ′, µ, k(µ)]Vh(θ, θ′)
+
(
1− µ
2
− k(µ)
)
Pr[θ′|θ, µ, k(µ)]Vl(θ′, θ)
]
. (3)
The right hand side of equation (3) implies that the expectation number of majority members
matched intra-group is 2 ×
(
1−µ
2 − k(µ)
)
Pr[θ|θ, µ, k(µ)]. The expected number of majority man-
contract to the worker and the worker exerts effort to produce goods accordingly. Different preferences may affect
the incentive schemes provided by the manager as well as the productivity of the worker. For instance, if both the
manager and the worker have certain social preferences, then the manager may reward the worker voluntarily and the
worker may reciprocate by exerting more effort. This results in higher economic outcome as well as a fairer division
of the outcome between the two as opposed to the case in which they are both individualistic. See Fehr, Klein and
Schmidt (2007) for theory and experimental studies on behavioral contracts involving inequality aversion.
19Here, we adopt two common assumptions from the literature of preference evolution. First, the pairwise inter-
action has a unique equilibrium for each pair of agents with any preference traits in the set of potential preferences
Θ. Methods of handling the potential problem of multiple equilibria in specific contexts have been discussed in the
literature (see for example, Alger and Weibull (2013)). Nevertheless, since we seek general results that can hold
across a variety of contexts, we maintain our assumption of uniqueness. Second, the agents have complete informa-
tion (see Eswaran and Neary (2014) for a discussion on the justification of observability of preferences by appealing
to the psychology of deception). If instead the agents have incomplete information, the equilibrium payoffs would be
functions of k(µ). The interesting point about the incomplete information scenario is that when political representa-
tives determine the allocation of high positions (k(µ)), they need to take into consideration how k(µ) affects agents’
information and their corresponding behaviors. Hence, the predictions of preference evolution may differ significantly
from the previous analysis of incomplete information in preference evolution without political institutions (see Ok
and Vega-Redondo (2001), Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2007) and Alger and Weibull (2013)). We leave this for future
research.
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agers hiring workers from the alternative preference group is given by
(µ
2 + k(µ)
)
Pr[θ|θ′, µ, k(µ)].
The expected number of workers from the majority that are employed by managers from the alter-
native preference group is
(
1−µ
2 − k(µ)
)
Pr[θ′|θ, µ, k(µ)].
Similarly, let G(µ, k(µ)) denote the average payoff of the alternative preference group given the
matching process, we have
G(µ, k(µ)) =
1
µ
·
[ (µ
2
+ k(µ)
)
Pr[θ′|θ′, µ, k(µ)]T (θ′, θ′) +
(
1− µ
2
− k(µ)
)
Pr[θ′|θ, µ, k(µ)]Vh(θ′, θ)
+
(µ
2
+ k(µ)
)
Pr[θ|θ′, µ, k(µ)]Vl(θ, θ′)
]
. (4)
The matching process defined here is role-specific and thus different from the random match-
ing process defined in the literature of preference evolution (see for example, Alger and Weibull
(2012, 2013)), which is only suitable for situations in which agents take homogeneous roles, and
consequently does not have a role assignment mechanism.
2.3 Inter-Generational Cultural Transmission
In this section, we model the process by which preferences are transmitted across generations. Here,
we develop a cultural transmission mechanism based on Bisin and Verdier (2001).20
After engaging in the economic activities described in Section 2.2, each agent gives birth to a
child and becomes a parent. Preferences are not inheritable, that is, children are not born with any
particular preference trait. Assume that parents prefer their children to adopt the preference which
maximizes the children’s expected payoffs.21 The parent can exert effort in influencing his child to
adopt his own preference.22 When the parent fails in inculcation, the child inherits a preference
trait from a role model randomly drawn from the population. In other words, the parents display
perfect empathy (toward their children): this idea captures the fact that preferences that are well
aligned with economic interests are often culturally supported (see Congleton (2011)).23
20Also see the early contributions by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985).
21For discussions on humans’ tendency of imitating the success, see Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2005).
22We assume that a parent can only instill his own preference into his child because in many circumstances it is
difficult for a parent to convince his child to adopt a particular preference while he himself behaves in a different way.
23Note that Bisin and Verdier (2001) make an alternative assumption called imperfect empathy in which the parents’
incentive to inculcate their own preferences is biased toward their own traits. As shown by Bisin and Verdier (2001),
strong “imperfect empathy” can lead to the phenomenon of cultural heterogeneity, since the alternative preference
group has strong tendency to resist assimilation by the majority, even when the majority is more economically
successful. In Section 5.3, we investigate the impact of “imperfect empathy” in our model.
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Time is discrete. In generation t, the size of the majority group with preference trait θ is 1−µt,
and the size of the alternative preference group with preference trait θ′ is µt.
Let d(µt, x) denote the probability of successful parent-to-child inculcation. d : [0, 1]× [0,∞)→
[0, 1] is twice differentiable in x. Assume ∂d(µt,x)∂x > 0 and
∂2d(µt,x)
∂x2
≤ 0: the probability of success
is strictly increasing and concave in parent’s effort. In addition, assume d(µt, 0) = 0; that is, when
a parent exerts no effort, transmission fails with probability 1. There is a cost associated with
exerting effort to inculcate. Let c : [0,∞) → [0,∞) be the cost function. The cost function is
identical for all parents and c(0) = 0, c′ > 0, c′′ > 0.
Let P θθt (x) = d(µt, x)+(1−d(µt, x))(1−µt) denote the probability that a child from a majority
family adopts the preference of his parent’s group. (1 − d(µt, x))(1 − µt) is the probability that a
parent fails to inculcate his child with his own preference but his child ends up finding a role model
with the same preference as his. Let P θθ
′
t (x) = (1− d(µt, x))µt denote the probability a child from
a majority family adopts the preference of the alternative preference group. This only happens
when a parent fails to inculcate his child with his own preference.
Each majority parent of generation t solves the following maximization problem to maximize
his child’s expected payoff minus the cost of effort24:
(~) max
x
[P θθt (x)F (µt, k(µt)) + P
θθ′
t (x)G(µt, k(µt))]− c(x).
When F (µt, k(µt) ≥ G(µt, k(µt)), the optimal effort x∗(µt, θ) of (~) solves:
µt(F (µt, k(µt))−G(µt, k(µt)))∂d(µt, x)
∂x
= c′(x).
Assume that interior solution always exists, x∗(µt, θ) is strictly positive. When F (µt, k(µt)) <
G(µt, k(µt)), a majority parent exerts no effort so that the probability that his child can meet an
alternative preference group adult is maximized. The optimal effort x∗(µt, θ) = 0.
Similarly, we can write down the decision problem faced by an alternative preference group
parent and obtain the corresponding optimal effort level x∗(µt, θ′).
24Note that we assume that the parents use their own generation’s average payoffs of the two groups to measure the
expected payoffs of their children. A reasonable alternative assumption would be that the parents form expectations
about the average payoffs of the two groups in the next generation. Nevertheless, the predictions of preference
evolution would be the same under the two assumptions since we consider the stability of a homogeneous population
in the later analysis. That is, we consider situations in which the size of the alternative preference group shrinks to
zero.
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In the continuum population, P θθ
′
t (x
∗(µt, θ)) also represents the fraction of children from θ fam-
ilies who adopt preference θ′ and P θ′θt (x∗(µt, θ′)) represents the fraction of children from θ′ families
who adopt preference θ. The following difference equation describes the dynamic of preference
evolution:
µt+1 = µt + (1− µt)P θθ′t (x∗(µt, θ))− µtP θ
′θ
t (x
∗(µt, θ′)), with initial µ0. (5)
3 Evolutionarily Stable Preferences
This section establishes the concepts of evolutionarily stable preferences. To start, we first express
the average payoffs of the two groups in the limit as µ goes to zero.
Let k0 = limµ→0
k(µ)
µ . Substitute (1)-(2) into (3)-(4) and take µ to zero. We have:
lim
µ→0
F (µ, k(µ)) =
1
2
T (θ, θ); (6)
lim
µ→0
G(µ, k(µ)) = (
1
2
− k0)Vh(θ′, θ) + (1
2
+ k0)Vl(θ, θ
′). (7)
Equations (6) and (7) represent the respective average payoffs of the majority group and the
alternative preference group in the limit. Fixing θ and θ′, we say θ is stable against θ′ if the size
of the alternative preference group with θ′ converges to zero in a population dominated by θ type
agents. We seek to identify θ that remains prevalent given the presence of different θ′. If the
preference trait of the majority group can assimilate all possible different preference traits, we call
this majority’s preference stable. We give the general definition for evolutionary stability:
Definition 1 A preference θ ∈ Θ is an evolutionarily stable preference (ESP) if for any alternative
preference group with θ′ 6= θ, there is a µ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that limt→∞ µt = 0 in the difference equation
(5) given any µ0 ∈ (0, µ0).
The following result provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for θ ∈ Θ to be an ESP:
Lemma 1 (i) If for any alternative preference group with preference θ′ 6= θ,
lim
µ→0
F (µ, k(µ)) > lim
µ→0
G(µ, k(µ)), (8)
then preference θ is an ESP.
(ii) If preference θ is an ESP, then limµ→0 F (µ, k(µ)) ≥ limµ→0G(µ, k(µ)), for any alternative
preference group with θ′ 6= θ.
Proof: See Appendix.
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Definition 1 states that preference θ is evolutionarily stable preference (ESP) if any alternative
preference group with preference θ′ 6= θ enters a population dominated by θ agents, the size of
the alternative preference group eventually shrinks to zero. The cultural transmission mechanism
specified in Section 2.3 implies that the size of the group with the higher average payoff increases.
Hence, if the average payoff of the majority is always larger than that of the alternative preference
group, the alternative preference group would eventually die out. Given θ and θ′, the condition
limµ→0 F (µ, k(µ)) > limµ→0G(µ, k(µ)) ensures that the average payoff of the majority is always
larger than that of the alternative preference group if the size of the alternative preference group
is sufficiently small. Therefore, there always exists an initial condition such that the dynamic
described in (5) converges to zero.25
We first consider a benchmark case in which the allocation of high positions between the two
groups is exogenously given as equal, i.e., k(µ) = 0. We call this proportional assignment. In this
case, Lemma 1 implies that the majority’s preference is evolutionarily stable under proportional
assignment if the average payoff of a majority member is higher than the average payoff of an
alternative preference group member when both of them have an equal chance to be a manager.
Note that Alger and Weibull (2012, 2013) also consider preference evolution in asymmetric pairwise
interactions with different roles and they arrive at a similar criterion for evolutionary stability as
in the proportional assignment case in our model. This is because in their works, after the agents
are matched in pairs, their roles are assigned randomly with equal probability as if there were a
proportional assignment. Therefore, the criterion for evolutionary stability for asymmetric pairwise
interactions in Alger and Weibull (2012, 2013) is a special case of Lemma 1.
We also introduce a weaker stability concept: locally evolutionarily stable preference:
Definition 2 A preference θ ∈ Θ is a locally evolutionarily stable preference (LESP) if there exists
δ > 0 such that for any alternative preference group with θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ)\{θ}, there is a µ0 ∈ (0, 1)
such that limt→∞ µt = 0 in the difference equation (5) given any µ0 ∈ (0, µ0).
LESP allows us to analyze how gradual changes in the distribution of preferences (i.e., the
emergence of alternative preference groups with preference traits that are similar to the majority)
affect long-run economic outcomes in a society under different political institutions. In Section 4,
25In addition, from Lemma 1, one can see that the concept of evolutionarily stable preference (ESP) is an analog
to the concept of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in evolutionary game theory (see a discussion in Alger and
Weibull (2012)).
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we show that given only assumption [A1], we can obtain sharp predictions by analyzing LESP.26
4 Preference Evolution under Different Political Institutions
This section studies preference evolution under a range of political institutions indexed by their
degrees of inclusiveness (Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)). The main players in the political insti-
tutions are the political representatives from the two groups.27 Since agents in each group have the
same preferences as well as common interests and shared goals, we assume here that selecting po-
litical representatives is effective among each group.28 In addition, for simplicity, we do not model
the incentive problems between the group members and their elective representatives explicitly.29
Instead, we assume the political representatives from both groups willingly represent the common
interests of their own groups.
Inclusiveness measures how much scope groups have to determine the allocation of high posi-
tions. We call a political institution more “exclusive” if the alternative preference group is excluded
from high positions or faces high barriers to acquire such positions. On the other hand, we call a
political institution more “inclusive” if the political representatives from the two groups interact
more equally to determine the allocation of high positions.
4.1 Unadulterated Majoritarianism
First, consider the evolution of preferences under the most exclusive political institution in which the
majority can exploit the alternative preference group without constraints. We call it “unadulterated
majoritarianism.” This refers to the general case of “winner takes all.”30
26Although the concept of an evolutionary stable preference (ESP) can be applied to study how a big breakthrough
in primitives (i.e., the emergence of an alternative preference group with a preference trait that is distinct from
the majority) affects long-run economic outcomes under different political institutions, we need assumptions much
stronger than Assumption [A1] to obtain analytic results.
27As stated in Macleod (2013), all successful human institutions delegate control rights to those individuals (the
political representatives in our context) that have the best information and the best incentive to decide appropriately.
28Note that there is an important literature considering the formation of interest groups and parties (Olson (1965),
Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980), Becker (1983), Congleton (1986), Austin-Smith (1987)). They mainly study
solutions to the free rider problem through political action as well as rent seeking and voting issues.
29See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a textbook treatment on incentive problems in political economy.
30For example, in ancient China, since the Sui Dynasty (AD 605), the imperial examination was an important
channel for people to obtain high positions in the social hierarchy. Although this examination system was open to
every citizen, it only tested the knowledge of Confucian morals (see Bai and Jia (2015)). Hence, those who disagreed
with the Confucian value system were completely excluded from accessing high positions. Today, systems of direct
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In this exclusive political institution, the political representatives of the majority group have
full authority in determining the allocation of high positions to maximize majority group’s average
payoff. If F (µ, σ(µ), k(µ)) increases in k(µ), then the majority would take all the high positions.
We have the following result:
Proposition 1 Every θ ∈ Θ is a LESP under unadulterated majoritarianism.
Proof: See Appendix.
When the alternative preference group’s preference θ′ is close enough to the majority prefer-
ence θ, F (µ, k(µ)) always increases in k(µ). Therefore, under unadulterated majoritarianism, the
majority’s political representatives set k(µ) to its maximum. The majority group members thus
have a higher average payoff and can assimilate the alternative preference group.
Although, majority voting is one of the most prevalent voting rules adopted in democratic
countries, Proposition 1 suggests that in a highly homogeneous society where the incumbents’ pref-
erences are associated with unfavorable economic outcomes, simple majority voting may not be a
good rule for determining the allocation of scarce resources, because the majority would rob itself
of the opportunity to better itself over multiple generations.
This result also helps to explain cultural assimilation. In our model, if the political institution
is exclusive, cultural transmission leads to cultural assimilation because the parents from the alter-
native preference group are less tempted to inculcate their own preference into their children given
that assimilating to the majority group leads to a higher chance of obtaining a high position in the
social hierarchy. As discussed in Kuran and Sandholm (2008), in the early 20th century, American
government and civic leaders actively promoted “Americanization” by rewarding immigrants who
opted for assimilation with promotions and status. This pressure to conform induced immigrants
to make compromises and eventually lead to integration.
4.2 Egalitarianism
In this section, we study a political institution in which the two group negotiates on the allocation
of high position and the bargaining power of a group is proportional to its group size. We call this
political institution “egalitarianism,” since the bargaining power of each group exactly reflects the
number of voters from the group. Egalitarianism serves as the most inclusive political institution in
democracy that simply follow majority voting but without sufficient constitutional checks and balances may also be
considered as versions of this exclusive political institution.
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our context, since it provides equality of opportunity for the two groups. It represents the common
form of proportional representational democracy.
Note that we have used the parsimonious notation k(µ) to denote the allocation of high positions
in the previous sections. Here, allocation of high positions is endogenously determined by the two
groups. Hence, it is a function of θ and θ′ and we use k(µ, θ, θ′) instead of k(µ).
Negotiation between the majority and the alternative preference group is modeled as a Nash
bargaining problem. Both the majority and the alternative preference group want to maximize
the average payoffs of their members. Therefore, the representatives of the two groups collectively
bargain over the division of high positions (i.e., role h in the pairwise interaction). If they cannot
come to an agreement, both groups get zero.31 The solution k∗(µ, θ, θ′) to the Nash bargaining
problem solves
(†) max
k(µ,θ,θ′)
F (µ, k(µ, θ, θ′))1−µG(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′))µ.
The interior solution k∗(µ, θ, θ′) to (†) satisfies the following first order condition:
G(µ, k∗(µ, θ, θ′))(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) + F (µ, k∗(µ, θ, θ′))µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) = 0. (9)
The marginal average payoff of the majority group with respect to the allocation of high positions
is represented by (1 − µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)). If (1 − µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) > 0, the majority benefits
from acquiring more high positions. The marginal average payoff of the alternative preference
group with respect to the allocation of high positions is represented by µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ
′)). If
µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ
′)) < 0, the alternative preference group benefits from acquiring more high positions.
Let k∗0(θ, θ′) = limµ→0
k∗(µ,θ,θ′)
µ . As µ approaches zero, the marginal benefits of acquiring high
positions for the two groups, (1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) and −µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)), are given as follows:
lim
µ→0
(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) = Vh(θ, θ′)− Vl(θ′, θ); (10)
lim
µ→0
−µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) = Vh(θ′, θ)− Vl(θ, θ′). (11)
To study the LESPs of the preference evolution under this political institution, we first need
to determine the signs of the limit derivatives shown in (10) and (11). Given assumption [A1], we
have the following result:
31As long as the outside options for both groups are equal constant and less than limµ→0 F (µ, 0), the results on
stability do not change. When the outside options of the two groups are unequal, they become a type of de facto
powers and affect the predictions of stability. We discuss unequal outside options in Section 5.2 in details.
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Lemma 2 Under assumption [A1], for each θ ∈ Θ, there exists δ > 0, such that for any θ′ ∈
B(θ, δ), limµ→0(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) > 0, limµ→0−µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) > 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 2 shows that when θ′ is close enough to θ, being a manager is always better than being a
worker for both groups’ members. Hence, both groups benefits from acquiring more high positions
in the social hierarchy. In addition, when θ′ and θ are sufficiently close, the interior solution always
exists and it is unique for the Nash bargaining problem. In other words, when considering local
stability, we do not worry about corner solutions . Lemma 2 also implies that when θ′ and θ are
close enough, the second order condition for the Nash bargaining problem is satisfied. We have the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 (1) If there exists a δ > 0 such that for any alternative preference group with
θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ)\{θ},
lim
µ→0
(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) > − lim
µ→0
µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ
′)), (12)
then θ is a LESP under egalitarianism.
(2) If θ is a LESP under egalitarianism, then there exists a δ > 0 such that we have limµ→0(1 −
µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ
′)) ≥ − limµ→0 µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)), for any alternative preference group with θ′ ∈
B(θ, δ)\{θ}.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that a preference θ is a LESP if the majority with preference θ marginally
benefits more from getting high positions than any alternative preference group with some similar
preference trait. Inequality (12) can be rewritten as:
T (θ, θ′) > T (θ′, θ). (13)
Inequality (13) implies that when a majority member matches with an alternative preference
group member, the firm they form yields a higher total surplus if the majority member is the
manager. In other words, a majority member “suits” the role of manager better than an alternative
preference group member.
Although inequality (13) demonstrates that the criterion for local stability is related to produc-
tivity of the firms the agents form, it does not necessarily induce the locally highest average payoff
for the society as a whole if all of the members in the society adopt such a preference. To see this,
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consider the case in which Θ ∈ Rn and T (·, ·) is differentiable in both augments, then inequality (13)
indicates that the necessary condition for θ to be LESP is that Dθ′T (θ, θ
′)|θ′=θ = Dθ′T (θ′, θ)|θ′=θ.
However, this condition does not implies that θ solves maxθ′ T (θ
′, θ′). Therefore, it is possible
that preference traits associated with unfavorable economic outcomes can still be prevalent under
egalitarianism.
4.3 Asymmetric Power Sharing
Unadulterated majoritarianism entitles the majority to exclusive power to determine the allocation
of high positions. While egalitarianism provides a political “level playing field” for both groups. In
the real world, more commonly seen are political institutions in which each group enjoys certain
political power but not necessarily proportional to its group size. For example, if suffrage is not
universal, some groups may be excluded from being represented in the parliament. New immigrants
in some countries may face voting restrictions. We call these political institutions asymmetric power
sharing political institutions. To model asymmetric power sharing political institutions, we extend
the political bargaining model we developed in Section 4.2 to allow for different distributions of
bargaining powers between the two groups. The distribution of bargaining power can serve as a
measure of inclusiveness or cohesiveness of a political institution, as suggested by Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012) and Besley and Persson (2011). For example, a proportional electoral system is
more inclusive than a majoritarian electoral system. We modify the Nash bargaining problem as
follows,
(‡) max
k(µ,θ,θ′)
F (µ, k(µ, θ, θ′))p(µ)G(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′))q(µ),
where p(µ) denotes the bargaining power of the majority and q(µ) denotes the bargaining power
of the alternative preference group. First, to normalize these bargaining powers, we assume that
limµ→0 p(µ) = 1. Second, in order to obtain interesting predictions, we focus on the case in which
the bargaining power of the alternative preference group decreases at the same speed as the size of
the alternative preference group, that is, limµ→0
q(µ)
µ = q0 > 0.
32
Note that when p(µ) = 1− µ and q(µ) = µ, we have egalitarianism. On the other hand, when
q0 = 0, we have unadulterated majoritarianism. In this section, we allow q0 to take any value
in [0, 1], and we call a political institution an asymmetric power sharing political institution if
32If we instead assume limµ→0 q(µ) > 0 or assume limµ→0
q(µ)
µ
= 0, then the bargaining power of the alternative
preference group is either too strong or too weak for the existence of an interior solution of the Nash bargaining
problem.
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q0 ∈ [0, 1).
The interior solution k∗(µ, θ, θ′) to (‡) satisfies the following first order condition:
G(µ, , k∗(µ, θ, θ′))p(µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) + F (µ, k∗(µ, θ, θ′))q(µ)Gk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) = 0. (14)
To facilitate the characterization of the relationship between bargaining power and the allocation
of high positions, we define the following function for the bargaining process, which measures the
comparative advantage in holding a high position of the alternative preference group:
Mˆ(θ, θ′) = lim
µ→0
[(−µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′))
G(µ, 0)
)
/
(
(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′))
F (µ, 0)
)]
= lim
µ→0
[(
µ
1− µ)(
EG,k
EF,k
|k=0
)]
, (15)
where EF,k is the elasticity of a majority member’s average payoff with respect to the allocation
of high positions and EG,k is the elasticity of an alternative preference group member’s average
payoff with respect to the allocation of high positions.
Function Mˆ always exists and that limθ′→θ Mˆ(θ, θ′) = 1. The following lemma shows that why
Mˆ is good measure of the comparative advantage of holding a high position of the alternative
preference group:
Lemma 3 When limµ→0(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) > 0 and limµ→0−µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) > 0, we have
(i) if 1q0 > Mˆ(θ, θ
′), then k∗0(θ, θ′) > 0; (ii) if
1
q0
= Mˆ(θ, θ′), then k∗0(θ, θ′) = 0; (iii) if
1
q0
< Mˆ(θ, θ′),
then k∗0(θ, θ′) < 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 3 shows that when both groups benefit from acquiring more high positions, the allocation
of high positions is determined by the comparison of the relative political power of the majority 1q0
and comparative advantage of holding a high position of the alternative preference group Mˆ(θ, θ′).
For example, case (i) states that when the majority group’s relative political power is higher than
the alternative preference group’s comparative advantage in holding a high position, the majority
group is able to obtain proportionally more high positions than the alternative preference group.
We characterize the relationship between bargaining power and the interior solution of the Nash
bargaining problem for every θ ∈ Θ, when θ′ approaches θ.
Lemma 4 Under assumption [A1], for any θ ∈ Θ, if q0 < 1, then there exists δ > 0 such that for
all θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ), k∗0(θ, θ′) > 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
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Lemma 4 is induced by Lemma 2, Lemma 3 and the fact limθ′→θ Mˆ(θ, θ′) = 1. The lemma states
that when θ and θ′ is close enough, if the majority has a fixed advantage in political power (q0 < 1),
the majority can acquire high positions for more than half of its members through bargaining. We
have the following result:
Proposition 3 In an asymmetric power sharing political institution, every θ ∈ Θ is a LESP.
Proof: See Appendix.
The proof of this proposition utilizes the fact that playing role h is always better than playing
role l when θ′ is sufficiently close to θ, and Lemma 4, which states that when q0 < 1, the majority
with θ can acquire more role h through political bargaining as long as the alternative preference
group’s preference θ′ is close to θ.
In other words, even a tiny advantage in bargaining power grants the majority more high
positions proportional to its group size, which allows the majority’s preference to prevail locally.
At first glance, Proposition 3 provides a similar prediction to that of Proposition 1. It would seem
that an asymmetric power sharing political institution that is close to egalitarianism is no different
from unadulterated majoritarianism. However, this impression is incorrect. To see the distinction
between these two types of political institutions, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 3 The assimilation set S(θ, q0) of preference θ ∈ Θ, given bargaining power q0 ∈ [0, 1],
is the largest open ball in Θ centered at θ such that for any θ′ ∈ S(θ, q0)/{θ},
(1) limµ→0(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) > 0 and limµ→0−µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) > 0;
(2) there is a µ0 ∈ (0, 1), such that limt→∞ µt = 0 for the difference equation (5),∀µ0 ∈ (0, µ0).
The assimilation set S(θ, q0) of preference θ, given q0, is defined as the largest open ball sur-
rounding θ such that for a population with majority group θ and alternative preference group
θ′ ∈ S(θ, q0)/{θ}, both groups would benefit from getting more high positions and the majority
would eventually assimilate the alternative preference group. We are interested in how the size of
such a set varies as the bargaining power changes. We have the following result:
Proposition 4 When q0 increases from q
1
0 to q
2
0, where 0 ≤ q10 < q20 ≤ 1, for any θ ∈ Θ, we have
S(θ, q10) ⊇ S(θ, q20).
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 4 shows that in political bargaining, as the inclusiveness of the political institution
increases (q0 ↑), the assimilation set shrinks. This result establishes that preference evolution has
stronger selection power under more inclusive political institutions.
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Proposition 4 implies that, given fixed θ and q0, for any θ
′ ∈ S(θ, q0), θ and θ′ satisfy
1− q0
q0
(Vh(θ, θ
′)− Vl(θ′, θ)) + T (θ, θ′) > T (θ, θ′). (16)
This inequality states that the majority group with preference trait θ can assimilate the alterna-
tive preference group with preference trait θ′ if the total surplus generated by a firm with a majority
manager and an alternative preference group worker plus a premium 1−q0q0 (Vh(θ, θ
′) − Vl(θ′, θ)) is
higher than the total surplus generated by a firm with an alternative preference group manager
and a majority worker. The difference between inequality (16) and inequality (13) is the premium
term. Moreover, the premium increases as the level of inclusiveness q0 decreases. This implies that
as a political institution becomes more exclusive, whether a majority member actually “suits” the
high position better than an alternative preference group member becomes less important. This
unites the conclusions drawn previously on unadulterated majoritarianism and egalitarianism.
4.4 Discussion
Social scientists have long considered the impact of political institutions on economic outcomes
through the channel of preference evolution. Weber (1930) argues that the spirit of capitalism,
including hard work, prudence and thrift, as opposed to economic traditionalism,33 was the key to
the development of technologies and modern enterprises that gave rise to the Industrial Revolution.
Weber also emphasizes the importance of political institutions. He asserts that as opposed to India
and China, one of the fundamental socioeconomic prerequisites for the emergence and prevalence of
the spirit of capitalism was the unique European phenomenon of semi-autonomous city, organized
and known as Commune, where residents enjoyed exceptional civil power. The transition of political
institutions from agrarian feudalism to bourgeois society in Western European countries laid down
the foundation for economic traditionalism to give way to the spirit of capitalism. More specifically,
the more inclusive political institutions allowed those who had the spirit of capitalism to own their
innovations and permitted them to use those innovations to enter traditional industries. This
allowed them to establish more efficient modern enterprises and accumulate more wealth, which at
the same time forced the “economic traditionalists” to give up their way of living. Soon, the spirit of
capitalism spread through Western Europe and detached from its religious roots of Protestantism.
33Weber (1930) describes “economic traditionalists” as those who do not ask how much they can earn in a day if
they do as much work as possible, but ask how much they must work in order to earn the wages which take care of
their traditional needs.
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Our model provides a theoretical support for Weber’s (1930) observation. We show that under
more exclusive political institutions, the majority is the “winner” in the competition for high
positions regardless of the preference trait its members carry. Therefore, a society can be locked
in a bad state associated with unfavorable economic outcomes. For example, before the Industrial
Revolution, in the Southern European countries, the Catholic Church succeeded in asserting itself
politically. Instead of meeting the challenge imposed by the Protestant Revolution, these countries
responded by closure and censorship. As argued in Tremor-Roper (1967), anti-Protestant reaction
more than Protestantism itself sealed the faith of the south. Imperial China serves as another
example. Before the 20th century, China was a culturally and intellectually homeostatic country,
the totalitarian government regulated every aspect of life by Confucianism, which impeded the
birth of capitalism.
On the other hand, our results suggest that preference evolution has stronger selection power
in more inclusive political institutions; only the preference traits which result in the locally largest
comparative advantage of holding a high position have high probabilities being the “winners. Landes
(1998) pointed out that, in Western Europe, the reach of the Catholic Church was limited by the
competing secular authorities. The fragmented political environment provided a “level play field”
for preference evolution. As a result, in manufacturing centers in France and Western Germany,
Protestants were typically the employers, Catholics the employed. In Switzerland, the Protestant
cantons were the centers of export manufacturing industry. In England, which by the end of the
16th Century, was overwhelmingly Protestant, the Dissenters were disproportionally active and
influential in the factories and forges of the nascent Industrial Revolution. This explains why the
spirit of capitalism was able to spread.
5 Extension
5.1 Assimilation Pressure, Self Segregation and Cultural Heterogeneity
Under many circumstances, the alternative preference group is disadvantaged in political decision
making. When the alternative preference group fails to have sufficient political power in the political
institution, do they have an alternative way to offset the majority’s political power?
New immigrant groups and minorities often form enclaves in which they establish their own
business networks and labor markets to provide businesses or employments for members because
they may not be able to access to work opportunities and resources that are controlled in the hands
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of the incumbents. Hence, self-segregation can be an effective way for these groups to protect
themselves.
In this section, we extend the matching process to allow for segregation and explore how different
political institutions interact with the matching process to affect the evolution of preferences.
Let σ(µ) ∈ [−1, 1] be the difference between the probability that a θ worker is matched with a
θ manager and the probability that a θ′ worker is matched with a θ manager:
σ(µ) = Pr[θ|θ, µ, k(µ)]− Pr[θ|θ′, µ, k(µ)]. (17)
Quantity σ(µ) measures the degree of segregation in the matching process. It is essentially a
generalization of the concept of algebra of assortative encounters developed by Bergstrom (2003)
and it is adopted in the study of preference evolution by Alger and Weibull (2012, 2013). Segregation
of matching process is commonly observed because people tend to interact with those in the same
geographical area or sharing similar arbitrary neutral cultural markers such as dialects (see Boyd
and Richerson (2005)). For consistency, the following balancing condition needs to be satisfied:
(
1− µ
2
− k(µ))Pr[θ|θ, µ, k(µ)] + (µ
2
+ k(µ))Pr[θ|θ′, µ, k(µ)] = 1− µ
2
+ k(µ). (18)
This condition states that the sum of majority workers matched with majority managers and the
alternative preference group workers matched with majority managers is equal to the total number
of managers in the majority. Let σ0 = limµ→0 σ(µ).34
Equations (17) and (18) together imply
Pr[θ|θ, µ, k(µ)] = 1− µ+ 2k(µ) + σ(µ)(µ+ 2k(µ)), (19)
Pr[θ|θ′, µ, k(µ)] = 1− µ+ 2k(µ)− σ(µ)(1− µ− 2k(µ)). (20)
And Pr[θ′|θ, µ, k(µ)] = 1− Pr[θ|θ, µ, k(µ)] and Pr[θ′|θ′, µ, k(µ)] = 1− Pr[θ|θ′, µ, k(µ)].
We now endogenize σ(µ). We assume that leaders of the alternative preference group, such as
political leaders or cultural activists whose interests aligns with their group members’ interests, can
segregate their group from the majority, so that their group members have a higher probability
of matching with one another.35 For example, the leaders can promote unique cultural markers
34Note that σ0 can only take values in [0,1], because the range of σ(µ) shrinks as µ decreases and σ0 must be
non-negative to ensure that the balancing equation (18) is not violated in the limit.
35See Kuran and Sandholm (2008) for a discussion of cultural activists. The tendency of self-matching is also called
homophily, which have been studied extensively in both sociology and economics. See McPherson et al. (2001), Ruef
et al. (2003), Jackson et al. (2009, 2010).
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such as manners of dress and dialects that increase the utility gain of self-matching. They can
also relocate the alternative preference group so that they are geographically segregated from the
majority.
In our model, the allocation of high positions is determined through the political institution.
On the other hand, more self-matching guarantees a group to have more managers. Hence, by
increasing the rate of self-matching, the alternative preference group may effectively reduce the
impact of the political advantage of the majority group. This in turn may change its members’
effort to inculcate and help the group to resist assimilation. Historically, certain ethnic groups,
such as the Maghribi traders (see Grief (1993, 1994)), had both a strong tendency to self-match as
well as a strong incentive to preserve their own culture across generations.
Assume that the main motivation for leaders of the alternative preference group is to maximize
the average payoff of its members.36 Whether a certain preference trait can survive through inten-
tional segregation depends on various factors such as the leaders’ ability to induce segregation as
well as the cost of segregation. Nevertheless, the most fundamental question is if the alternative
preference group members would benefit from segregation at the first place. We formally explore
this question. First, we examine the benchmark case of proportional assignment (k(µ) = 0), in
which a political institution is absent:
Proposition 5 Under proportional assignment, there exists a µ > 0 such that for any 0 < µ < µ,
an alternative preference group with preference θ′ ∈ Θ would benefit from increasing segregation
against a majority with preference θ ∈ Θ if
Vh(θ
′, θ′) + Vl(θ′, θ′) > Vh(θ′, θ) + Vl(θ, θ′). (21)
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that under proportional assignment, if on average, the alternative prefer-
ence group members achieve a higher payoff by self-matching than by matching with the majority
members, their leaders have an incentive to increase segregation.
Next, we investigate exclusive political institutions:
Proposition 6 There exists a 0 < q
0
< 1 such that for any 0 ≤ q0 ≤ q0, there exists a δ > 0
such that for any θ ∈ B(θ′, δ), there exists a µ > 0 such that for any 0 < µ < µ, an alternative
36There are other possible motivations for the leaders of the alternative preference group. One alternative motiva-
tion would be to expand their own groups’ memberships because they can benefit from group expansion.
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preference group with preference θ′ ∈ Θ would always benefit from increasing segregation against a
majority with preference θ.
Proof: See Appendix.
When the political institution is sufficiently exclusive, the majority exploits its political power
to obtain the maximal amount of high positions. However, this maximum is a decreasing function
of σ0. Hence, the alternative preference group’s average payoff is an increasing function of σ0 when
µ approaches zero.
Proposition 6 implies that in sufficiently exclusive political institutions, segregation can serve
as a self-defense mechanism for the alternative preference group, since the alternative preference
group can offset the political advantage of the majority by increasing segregation.
Finally, we investigate inclusive political institutions:
Proposition 7 There exists a 0 < q0 < 1 such that for any q0 ≤ q0 ≤ 1, there exists a δ > 0
such that for any θ ∈ B(θ′, δ), there exists a µ > 0 such that for any 0 < µ < µ, an alternative
preference group with preference θ′ ∈ Θ would benefit from increasing segregation against a majority
with preference θ, if
Vh(θ, θ
′) + Vl(θ′, θ) > Vh(θ, θ) + Vl(θ, θ), and Vh(θ′, θ) + Vl(θ, θ′) > Vh(θ′, θ′) + Vl(θ′, θ′). (22)
On the other hand, an alternative preference group with preference θ′ cannot benefit from increasing
segregation against a majority with preference θ if
Vh(θ, θ
′) + Vl(θ′, θ) < Vh(θ, θ) + Vl(θ, θ), and Vh(θ′, θ) + Vl(θ, θ′) < Vh(θ′, θ′) + Vl(θ′, θ′). (23)
Proof: See details in Appendix.
Proposition 7 describes the two possible scenarios that can arise under sufficiently inclusive
political institutions: 1) if both the majority and the alternative preference group members do
worse on average by self-matching than matching with agents from their opposite groups, then the
alternative preference group can benefit from increasing segregation; 2) if both the majority and
the alternative preference group members do better on average by self-matching than matching
with agents from their opposite groups, then the alternative preference group cannot benefit from
increasing segregation.37
37Unfortunately, there is no definite answer for cases in which one group does better on average by self-matching,
while the other group does not.
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The intuition is as follows. Because of the unbalanced sizes of the two groups, when (22) is
satisfied, the marginal benefit of getting more high positions for the alternative preference group
is increasing in σ0 and the marginal benefit of getting more high positions for the majority is
decreasing in σ0. Therefore, even though the alternative preference group members perform worse
in self-matching, increasing self-segregation can empower them with high de facto political power
in the negotiation. The interpretation of condition (23) follows in the same spirit.
Propositions 5 to 7 show that different political institutions may provide distinct motives for
the leaders of alternative preference group to segregate their group members from the majority.
Segregation in turn affects parents’ effort to inculcate. Therefore, it is important for policymakers to
consider the underlying political structure when evaluating phenomena such as cultural integration
and cultural heterogeneity.38
5.2 Asymmetric Outside Options
As noted in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b, 2008), in many Latin American, Caribbean, and
African countries, inefficient economic institutions still persist even when political institutions be-
come more inclusive. Our model can provide an evolutionary explanation for these observations.
To do so, we generalize our model to incorporate an important source of de facto political pow-
ers that are independent of the political institution: the outside options of the two groups in case
an agreement cannot be reached in the political institution. The outside options can be considered
as the payoffs generated by individual activities such as traditional handicraft as opposed to more
sophisticated form of economic activities involving collaborations and exchange characterized by
the pairwise interactions. Here, we model the outside option of a group as a function of the pref-
erence trait of its members. Let H(·) : Θ→ R+ denote the outside option function and assume that
Assumption [A2] 12T (θ1, θ2) > H(θ3) for any θ1, θ2, θ3 ∈ Θ.
38Note that in the literature of cultural transmission, several works also study the issue of segregation. However,
the types of segregation they consider are different from ours, which are driven by “imperfect empathy.” For example,
Bisin and Verdier (2000a) study segregation in the marriage market. In their paper, people want to segregate
themselves in the marriage market because a homogeneous marriage ensures successful parent-to-child transmission.
Moreover, since parents have imperfect empathy, they prefer their children to adopt their own preferences; engaging
in homogeneous marriage is the most efficient way to achieve such a goal. In addition, Bisin and Verdier (2001) and
Saez Marti and Sjo¨gren (2008) study segregation in cultural transmission. When parents with imperfect empathy
consider the possible peer effects faced by their children, they attempt to reduce the probability that their children
meet a role model from the opposite group.
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Assumption [A2] states that the average payoff of a pair of agents engaging in the pairwise inter-
action is always higher than the payoff generated by individual activity. This assumption provides
the incentive for the political representatives to engage in political bargaining at the first place.
The Nash bargaining problem in Section 4.2 can be rewritten as
(⊕) max
k(µ,θ,θ′)
(F (µ, k(µ, θ, θ′))−H(θ))1−µG(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)−H(θ′))µ.
And we have the following result:
Proposition 8 If there exists a δ > 0 such that for any alternative preference group with θ′ ∈
B(θ, δ)\{θ}, either H(θ) > H(θ′) + c for some constant c > 0, or
lim
µ→0
(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′))
1
2T (θ, θ)−H(θ′)
1
2T (θ, θ)−H(θ)
> − lim
µ→0
µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ
′)), (24)
then θ is a LESP under egalitarianism.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 8 shows that even the majority does not have a higher marginal benefit of getting
more high positions, it can still assimilate alternative preference groups as long as the majority
members can generate sufficiently high payoffs by engaging in individual activities. Hence, pref-
erences that potentially lead to better economic outcomes in pairwise interactions fail to spread.
Abandoning a literal interpretation, Proposition 8 helps to explain why certain backward socioeco-
nomic arrangements, which vanished long ago, still have persistent influence on today’s economic
performance in societies with inclusive political institutions.
5.3 Imperfect Empathy
In the cultural transmission part of the model, we assume that the parents have “perfect empathy.”
In this section, we examine the case in which the parents have “imperfect empathy.”
For tractability, we assume that a θ parent’s optimization problem is:
max
x
[P θθt (x)F (µt, k(µt)) + P
θθ′
t (x)(G(µt, k(µt))−∆(θ, θ′))]− c(x), (25)
where the additive separable term ∆(θ, θ′) denote the “cultural intolerance” of a θ agent has towards
the θ′ trait. In other words, a θ parent would derive a disutility ∆(θ, θ′) if his child becomes a θ′
agent.
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Similarly, the optimization problem of a θ′ parent’s optimization problem is given by:
max
x
[P θ
′θ′
t (x)G(µt, k(µt)) + P
θ′θ
t (x)(F (µt, k(µt))−∆(θ′, θ))]− c(x), (26)
where ∆(θ′, θ) is the “cultural intolerance” of a θ′ agent has towards the θ trait. The distuilities
∆(θ, θ′) and ∆(θ′, θ) captures parents’ “imperfect empathy.”
Assume that ∆(·, ·) : Θ × Θ → R is a continuous function, with ∆(θ, θ) = 0 for any θ ∈ Θ.
Moreover, ∆(θ, θ′) is increasing in the distance between θ and θ′ on the trait space. This captures
the fact that people have stronger biases towards those with more distinct preferences.39
Maximization problems (25) and (26) implies that when µt is sufficiently small, the key for
the alternative preference group to expand is that G(µt, k(µt)) > F (µt, k(µt)) − ∆(θ′, θ). This
inequality ensures that the alternative preference group parents have incentive to exert effort on
inculcation and small µt ensures that their incentive is much stronger than that of the majority
parents because of the rarity of the θ′ type role model in the population.
We have the following result:
Proposition 9 (1)Every θ ∈ Θ is a LESP under unadulterated majoritariansim.
(2)If there exists a δ > 0 such that for any alternative preference group with θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ)\{θ},
T (θ, θ′) > T (θ′, θ) + 2∆(θ′, θ)
Vh(θ, θ
′)− Vl(θ′, θ)
T (θ, θ)
, (27)
then θ is LESP under egalitarianism.
Proposition 9 (1) demonstrates that our result under unadulterated majoritarianism is robust
when “imperfect empathy” is introduced. The rationale is that under unadulterated majoritar-
ianism, “cultural intolerance” of the alternative preference group members towards the majority
cannot counterbalance the payoff advantage of the majority. Therefore, it is still optimal for the
alternative preference group’s parents not to exert effort on inculcation. This leads to assimilation
of the group.
Proposition 9 (2) provide a stronger condition described by (27) for an θ to be LESP than the
one described by (13) we obtained in Proposition 2 because in order to dominate the whole society,
39As argued in Spolaore and Waacziarg (2009, 2013), differences in cultural traits across populations can hinder
development by creating barriers to the flow of technological and institutional innovations, since more closely related
societies are more likely to learn from each other and adopt each others’ innovations. Guiso, Sapianza and Zingales
(2009) find that in the context of economic exchange, people from culturally more similar countries trust each other
more. These empirical findings reflect the fact that people are less comfortable with culturally more distant people.
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θ type needs to overcome the “cultural intolerance” imposed by the alternative preference group
members. This requires θ type to fit the high position even better.
In summary, Proposition 9 indicates that the influence of “imperfect empathy” on preference
evolution hinges on the political institution in a society.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we seek to answer the question of how conducive different political institutions are
to spreading preference traits that induce favorable economic outcomes. Our results suggest that
whether a certain preference trait can be prevalent or survive in a society is determined by the
degree of “inclusiveness” of the political institution.
There are two widely discussed views of growth theory in the literature. The first view is rooted
in Solow (1956), who emphasizes that technological change is the engine of long run growth. The
second view sterns from Lewis (1954), who links poverty to resource misallocation. In our model,
the primary function of political institution is to determine the allocation of one particular type
of scarce resources, high positions in the social hierarchy. If high position agents are the ones who
decide whether to adopt new technologies, how high positions are allocated to different preference
groups would affect the technology adoption rate of the society. Thus, this paper may contribute
to unifying these two major views of growth theory from an evolutionary perspective.
The framework we establish is one way to understand the impacts of political institutions on
preference evolution and its corresponding economic consequences. It can be extended in many di-
rections. First, in reality, stickiness in upward social mobility is usually rooted in the inheritability
of certain positions in the social hierarchy. Hence, it would be an exciting and challenging direction
for future research to enrich the cultural transmission mechanism to allow for the inheritability of
positions. Second, the primary function of political institutions which we examine in this paper is
that of determining the allocation of positions in the social hierarchy because we believe that this
function has non-negligible influence on preference evolution. However, it is still necessary to incor-
porate other important functions of political institutions such as fiscal policies, legal enforcement,
school financing and regulations to have a more complete understanding of the effects of political
institutions on preference evolution. Third, we treat political institutions as exogenous. Incor-
porating an endogenously generated dynamic of political institutions into the study of preference
evolution would serve as an important research avenue for the future.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 We first prove the necessary part. It is equivalent to prove the contrapositive
of the statement. If there exists a θ′ 6= θ such that limµ→0 F (µ, k(µ)) < limµ→0G(µ, k(µ)), by
continuity, we can always find a µ > 0, such that for all µ ∈ [0, µ), F (µ, k(µ)) < G(µ, k(µ)).
Recall that the preference evolution dynamic is given by
µt+1 = µt + (1− µt)P θθ′t (x∗(µt, θ))− µtP θ
′θ
t (x
∗(µt, θ′)).
If at time t, the size of the mutant group µt is in the interval [0, µ), then F (µt, k(µt)) < G(µt, k(µt)).
The optimal effort level of a majority parent is x∗(µt, θ) = 0. The optimal effort level of an alter-
native preference group parent x∗(µt, θ′) is positive.
Hence, P θθ
′
t (x
∗(µt, θ)) = (1−d(µt, x∗(µt, θ)))µt = µt, P θ′θt (x∗(µt, θ′)) = (1−d(µt, x∗(µt, θ′)))(1−
µt) < (1− µt). This implies that (1− µt)P θθ′t (x∗(µt, θ)) = (1− µt)µt > µtP θ
′θ
t (x
∗(µt, θ′)).
Therefore, for any µ0 > 0, as long as the dynamic reaches a state µ ∈ [0, µ) at a finite time t,
we have µt+1 > µt. Hence, θ is not an ESP.
Next, we prove the sufficient part. If for all θ′ 6= θ, limµ→0 F (µ, k(µ)) > limµ→0G(µ, k(µ)), then
by continuity, we can find a µ0 > 0 such that, for all µ ∈ [0, µ0), F (µ, k(µ)) > G(µ, k(µ)).
Using similar logic, we know µt+1 < µt if and only if F (µ, k(µ)) > G(µ, k(µ)). Therefore, for
all µ0 ∈ [0, µ0), µt+1 < µt for any t ≥ 0. Hence, θ is an ESP. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1 By Assumption [A1], we have limθ′→θ limµ→0 Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) = Vh(θ, θ)−
Vl(θ, θ) > 0. Hence, under unadulterated majoritarianism, ∃δ > 0, such that for any θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ),
k∗0 =
1
2 . The average payoff of the alternative preference group when taking the limit of θ
′
to θ and µ to 0 is given by: limθ′→θ limµ→0G(µ, k∗(µ)) = Vl(θ, θ), while limµ→0 F (µ, k∗(µ)) =
1
2(Vh(θ, θ) + Vl(θ, θ)).
Therefore, by Assumption [A1] again, there exists a δ > 0 such that for any θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ), the
alternative preference group’s average payoff is lower than that of the majority and by Lemma 1,
θ is a LESP. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2 From the proof of Proposition 1, we already know that limθ′→θ limµ→0(1 −
µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ
′)) = Vh(θ, θ)−Vl(θ, θ) > 0. Similarly, we have limθ′→θ limµ→0−µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) =
Vh(θ, θ)− Vl(θ, θ) > 0.
Hence, there exists a δ > 0, such that for θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ), we have both limµ→0(1−µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) >
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0 and limµ→0−µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 To prove the sufficient part, we first derive the expression for k∗0(θ, θ′)
from the first order condition by taking the limit as µ goes to zero, provided that it exists and is
unique (by Lemma 2):
k∗0(θ, θ
′) = − limµ→0 F (µ, 0) limµ→0 µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ
′))
limµ→0(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) limµ→0 µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′))
− limµ→0G(µ, 0) limµ→0(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ
′))
limµ→0(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) limµ→0 µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) .
Plugging this expression of k∗0(θ, θ′) into the expression of limµ→0G(µ, k∗(µ, θ, θ′)), we have
lim
µ→0
G(µ, k∗(µ, θ, θ′)) = lim
µ→0
F (µ, 0)
− limµ→0 µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′))
limµ→0(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) .
Therefore, if there exists a δ > 0, such that for any θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ)\{θ}, an unique interior solution
to the Nash bargaining problem exists (guaranteed by Lemma 2 when δ is sufficient small) and
limµ→0(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) > limµ→0−µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)). Then we have
lim
µ→0
F (µ, k∗(µ, θ, θ′)) = lim
µ→0
F (µ, 0) > lim
µ→0
G(µ, k∗(µ, θ, θ′)),
for any θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ)\{θ}. By Lemma 1, this implies that θ is a LESP.
Next, we prove the necessary part, which is equivalent to proving the contrapositive of the
statement. Assume that for any δ > 0, one can find a θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ)\{θ} such that limµ→0(1 −
µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ
′)) < − limµ→0 µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) (when δ sufficiently small, k∗0(θ, θ′) exists and is
unique). Then limµ→0 F (µ, k∗(µ, θ, θ′)) < limµ→0G(µ, k∗(µ, θ, θ′)), for this θ′.
This implies that one can always find θ′ 6= θ that is arbitrarily close to θ and yields a higher
average payoff than θ. Therefore, θ cannot be locally stable. Q.E.D
Proof of Lemma 3 Here we only prove the first case. The other two cases follow similar logic.
Under asymmetric power sharing political institutions, as µ goes to zero, the first order condition
of the Nash bargaining problem can be rewritten as:
q0
− limµ→0 F (µ, 0) limµ→0 µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′))
limµ→0(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) = limµ→0G(µ, 0) + limµ→0µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ
′))k∗0(θ, θ
′).
Hence, when limµ→0 µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) < 0, we have k∗0(θ, θ′) > 0 if
1
q0
> − limµ→0 F (µ, 0) limµ→0 µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ
′))
limµ→0G(µ, 0) limµ→0(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) = Mˆ(θ, θ
′). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 4 By Lemma 2, we know that when θ′ is sufficiently close to θ, limµ→0(1 −
µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ
′)) > 0 and limµ→0−µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) > 0. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 3.
When q0 < 1, since limθ′→θ Mˆ(θ, θ′) = 1, for any θ ∈ Θ, we can find a δ > 0 such that 1q0 > Mˆ(θ, θ′)
for any θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ). By Lemma 3, we know that k∗0(θ, θ′) > 0 for θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 For any θ ∈ Θ, we have
lim
θ′→θ
lim
µ→0
G(µ, k∗(µ, θ, θ′)) = (
1
2
− lim
θ′→θ
k∗0(θ, θ
′))Vh(θ, θ) + (
1
2
+ lim
θ′→θ
k∗0(θ, θ
′))Vl(θ, θ).
Lemma 4 states that under assumption [A1], if q0 < 1, ∃δ > 0 such that ∀θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ), k∗0(θ, θ′) >
0. Hence limθ′→θ limµ→0 F (µ, k∗(µ, θ, θ′)) = 12(Vh(θ, θ)+Vl(θ, θ)) > limθ′→θ limµ→0G(µ, k
∗(µ, θ, θ′)).
This implies that one can find a δ′ ∈ (0, δ) such that for all θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ′)\{θ}, the sufficient condition
in Lemma 1 holds. Hence, any θ ∈ Θ is a LESP. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4 For any θ′ ∈ S(θ, q0)/{θ}, by definition, both groups would benefit
from getting more high positions. This in turn implies that k∗0(θ, θ′) is weakly decreasing in q0
(only weakly since when k∗0(θ, θ′) reaches its upper boundary
1
2 , it cannot increase any more when
q0 decreases). Hence, if a majority with θ can assimilate an alternative preference group with
θ′ ∈ S(θ, q20), it can still assimilate the alternative preference group with the same θ′ given bar-
gaining power q10 < q
2
0, since the majority can get weakly more high positions. This implies that
S(θ, q20) ⊆ S(θ, q10). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5 By solving the first order condition of the modified Nash bargaining
problem with asymmetric outside options (if the interior solution exists), and taking the limit of θ′
to θ, we have limθ′→θ k∗0(θ, θ′) =
H(θ)−limθ′→θ H(θ′)
Vh(θ,θ)−Vl(θ,θ) .
Hence, as long as there exists a δ > 0, such that for any θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ)\{θ}, H(θ) > H(θ′) + c,
for some constant c > 0. k∗0(θ, θ′) > 0 (it is possible that k∗0(θ, θ′) =
1
2 in this case). By a similar
argument as in Proposition 3, θ is LESP.
On the other hand, when the above condition is not satisfied, plug the expression of k∗0(θ, θ′)
into the expression of limµ→0G(µ, σ(µ), k∗(µ, θ, θ′)), we have
lim
µ→0
G(µ, σ(µ), k∗(µ, θ, θ′)) = H(θ′) + ( lim
µ→0
F (µ, σ(µ), 0)−H(θ′)) − limµ→0 µGk(µ, σ(µ), k(µ, θ, θ
′))
limµ→0(1− µ)Fk(µ, σ(µ), k(µ, θ, θ′)) .
Therefore, if there exists a δ > 0, such that for any θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ)\{θ}, an unique interior solution
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to the Nash bargaining problem exists (guaranteed by Lemma 2 when δ is sufficient small) and
limµ→0(1− µ)Fk(µ, σ(µ), k(µ, θ, θ′))
1
2
T (θ,θ)−H(θ′)
1
2
T (θ,θ)−H(θ) > limµ→0−µGk(µ, σ(µ), k(µ, θ, θ′)), we have
lim
µ→0
F (µ, σ(µ), k∗(µ, θ, θ′)) > lim
µ→0
G(µ, σ(µ), k∗(µ, θ, θ′)),
for any θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ)\{θ}. By Lemma 1, this implies that θ is a LESP. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6 The average payoff of the alternative preference group under propor-
tional assignment when µ converges to zero is given by limµ→0G(µ, σ(µ), k(µ)) = 12σ0T (θ
′, θ′) +
1
2(1 − σ0)(Vh(θ′, θ) + Vl(θ, θ′)), which is an increasing function in σ0 if inequality (22) is satisfied.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7 When q0 is sufficiently close to 0 and θ is sufficiently close to θ
′, the
Nash equilibrium problem admits a corner solution in which the equilibrium k∗0(θ, θ′) reaches its
maximum 1−σ02(1+σ0) , because the maximum amount of high positions that the majority can obtain
satisfies: (12 − k∗0)− (12 + k∗0)σ0 = 0.
Given this, when µ converges to zero, the alternative preference group’s average payoff equals
limµ→0G(µ, σ(µ), k(µ)) = σ01+σ0 (Vh(θ
′, θ′)+Vl(θ′, θ′))+ 1−σ01+σ0Vl(θ, θ
′), which is an increasing function
of σ0, as long as θ
′ and θ are sufficiently close. Hence, the alternative preference group would always
want to increase segregation. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8 In asymmetric power sharing political institutions, one can always find
0 < q0 < 1, such that for any q0 < q0 ≤ 1, the Nash bargaining problem has a unique interior solu-
tion. Hence, we have limµ→0G(µ, σ(µ), k∗(µ)) = 12(Vh(θ, θ) + Vl(θ, θ))
−q0 limµ→0 µGk(µ,σ(µ),k(µ,θ,θ′))
limµ→0(1−µ)Fk(µ,σ(µ),k(µ,θ,θ′)) .
If we take the derivatives of the marginal benefit of getting more high positions for the two
groups with respect to σ(µ), we have limµ→0(1 − µ) ∂∂σ(µ)Fk(µ, σ(µ), k(µ)) = Vh(θ, θ) + Vl(θ, θ) −
(Vh(θ, θ
′)+Vl(θ, θ′)); − limµ→0 µ ∂∂σ(µ)Gk(µ, σ(µ), k(µ)) = Vh(θ′, θ)+Vl(θ, θ′)−(Vh(θ′, θ′)+Vl(θ′, θ′)).
When Vh(θ, θ
′) + Vl(θ′, θ) > Vh(θ, θ) + Vl(θ, θ), and Vh(θ′, θ) + Vl(θ, θ′) > Vh(θ′, θ′) + Vl(θ′, θ′),
the average payoff of the alternative preference group is an increasing function of σ(µ) when µ is
sufficiently small. Hence, the alternative preference group would benefit from increasing segregation.
On the contrary, when Vh(θ, θ
′) + Vl(θ′, θ) < Vh(θ, θ) + Vl(θ, θ), and Vh(θ′, θ) + Vl(θ, θ′) <
Vh(θ
′, θ′) + Vl(θ′, θ′), the average payoff of the alternative preference group is a decreasing function
of σ(µ), when µ is sufficiently small. Hence, the alternative preference group cannot benefit from
increasing segregation. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 9
(1) Under unadulterated majoritarianism, we know limθ′→θ limµ→0G(µ, k∗(µ)) = Vl(θ, θ), which is
strictly smaller than limµ→0 F (µ, k∗(µ)) = 12(Vh(θ, θ) + Vl(θ, θ)). Given that limθ′→θ ∆θ,θ′ = 0. By
continuity, there exists a δ > 0, such that for any θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ)\{θ}, there exists a µ, such that for
any µt ∈ (0, µ), G(µt, 12) < F (µt, 12)−∆(θ, θ′). Therefore, any θ ∈ Θ is LESP.
(2) From the proof of Proposition 2, under egalitarianism, we know
lim
µ→0
G(µ, k∗(µ, θ, θ′)) = lim
µ→0
F (µ, 0)
− limµ→0 µGk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′))
limµ→0(1− µ)Fk(µ, k(µ, θ, θ′)) .
Hence, if limµ→0 F (µ, 0)
− limµ→0 µGk(µ,k(µ,θ,θ′))
limµ→0(1−µ)Fk(µ,k(µ,θ,θ′)) < limµ→0 F (µ, 0)−∆(θ, θ′) for any θ′ ∈ B(θ, δ)\{θ}
for some δ > 0, then θ is LESP. This is equivalent to
T (θ, θ′) > T (θ′, θ) + 2∆(θ′, θ)
Vh(θ, θ
′)− Vl(θ′, θ)
T (θ, θ)
.
Q.E.D.
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